Pse Amerika dhe Kina do të përplasen

Përplasja e kompanisë Google me Kinën ka të
bëjë më shumë se sa thjesht me fatin e një kompanie të vetme
Nga Gideon
Rachman*
English
Version Below
Vendimi i kompanisë për tu tërhequr nga Kina,
nëse qeveria kineze nuk ndryshon politikat mbi censurën, tregon marrëdhëniet
gjithmonë e më shumë problematike mes SHBA-ve dhe Kinës.
Rasti i kompanisë Google është i rëndësishëm, pasi ai sugjeron se gjykimet,
mbi të cilat është ngritur politika amerikane ndaj Kinës, që nga masakra e
Tianmenit në vitin 1989 e këtej, janë të gabuara.
Amerika e ka mirëpritur daljen e Kinës si një gjigant ekonomik duke besuar se
hapja ekonomike do të çonte drejt liberalizimit politik të këtij vendi.
Nëse ky gjykim ndryshon, atëherë mund të ndryshojë dhe politika amerikane ndaj
Kinës. Është tjetër gjë të mirëpresësh ngritjen ekonomike të një vendi që po
shndërrohet në demokraci liberale dhe tjetër gjë është rritja ekonomike e një
shteti leninist njëpartiak.
Të dy ish-presidentët amerikanë, Bush e Klinton, kanë pasur bindjen e thellë se
tregtia, e në veçanti koha e internetit dhe informacionit, do ti bënin të parezistueshme
ndryshimet politike në Kinë.
Këtë e theksoi presidenti Klinton gjatë një vizite në Pekin, në vitin 1998, kur
tha se, në kohën e teknologjisë dhe informacionit, kur suksesi ekonomik
bazohet tek idetë, liritë individuale janë thelbësore për madhështinë e çdo
kombi.
Të njëjtën ide theksoi një vit më pas dhe presidenti Bush.
Por, deri tani faktet nuk e miratojnë një teori të tillë. Kina ka vazhduar të
censurojë mediat, por nuk ka parë ndonjë rënie ekonomike.
Përkundrazi, sot ajo është ekonomia e dytë më e madhe në botë dhe eksportuesi
numër një në plan global.
Nga ana tjetër, qeveria kineze vetëm sa po bëhet më shtypëse. Vendimi i
kompanisë Google për tu përballur me qeverinë kineze, është shenjë se
amerikanët janë të lodhur me marrëdhëniet me regjimin autoritar kinez.
Edhe nëse administrata amerikane nuk do të bëjë hapa përpara në këtë drejtim,
zërat që kërkojnë politika më të ashpra ndaj Kinës do të bëhen më të fortë në
Kongres.
Vendimi i Google për të folur publikisht mbi sulmet në internet të Kinës, do
të luajë një rol në rritjen e drojës amerikane nga Kina në çështjet e sigurisë.
Shtetet e Bashkuara kanë qenë thuajse naive në lidhjet mes tregut të lirë dhe
demokracisë. Kinezët kanë qenë provokativë lidhur me çështjet e monedhës dhe të
drejtave të njeriut.
Nëse ata duan të mënjanojnë një përplasje të dëmshme me Amerikën, ndryshimi i
politikës është i këshillueshëm.
(*) "Financial Times"
English Version
Why America and China will clash
By Gideon Rachman
Googles clash with China is about much
more than the fate of a single, powerful firm. The companys decision
to pull out of China, unless the government there changes its policies on
censorship, is a harbinger of increasingly stormy relations between the US and
China.
The reason that the Google case is so
significant is because it suggests that the assumptions on which US policy to
China have been based since the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 could be plain
wrong. The US has accepted even welcomed Chinas emergence as a giant economic
power because American policymakers convinced themselves that economic opening
would lead to political liberalisation in China.
If that assumption changes, American
policy towards China could change with it. Welcoming the rise of a giant
Asian economy that is also turning into a liberal democracy is one thing.
Sponsoring the rise of a Leninist one-party state, that is Americas only
plausible geopolitical rival, is a different proposition. Combine this
political disillusionment with double-digit unemployment in the US that is
widely blamed on Chinese currency manipulation, and you have the formula for an
anti-China backlash.
Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
firmly believed that free trade and, in particular, the information age would
make political change in China irresistible. On a visit to China in 1998, Mr
Clinton proclaimed: In this global information age, when economic success is
built on ideas, personal freedom is essential to the greatness of any nation.
A year later, Mr Bush made a similar point: Economic freedom creates habits of
liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy ... Trade
freely with the Chinese and time is on our side.
The two presidents were reflecting the
conventional wisdom among Americas most influential pundits. Tom Friedman, New
York Times columnist and author of best-selling books on globalisation, once
proclaimed bluntly: Chinas going to have a free press. Globalisation will
drive it. Robert Wright, one of Mr Clintons favourite thinkers, argued that
if China chose to block free access to the internet, the price would be dismal
economic failure.
So far, the facts are refusing to conform to
the theory. China has continued to censor new and old media, but this has
hardly condemned it to dismal economic failure. On the contrary, China is now
the worlds second largest economy and its largest exporter, with foreign
reserves above $2,000bn. But all this economic growth shows little sign of
provoking the political changes anticipated by Bush and Clinton. If anything,
the Chinese government seems to be getting more repressive. Liu Xiaobo, a
leading Chinese dissident, was recently sentenced to 11 years in prison for his
involvement in the Charter 08 movement that advocates democratic reforms.
Googles decision to confront the Chinese
government is an early sign that the Americans are getting fed up with dealing
with Chinese authoritarianism. But the biggest pressures are likely to come
from politicians rather than businessmen. Google is an unusual company in an
unusually politicised industry. If the Googlers do indeed head for the exits in
China, they are unlikely to be crushed by a stampede of other multinationals
rushing to follow them. To most big companies the countrys market is too large
and tempting to ignore. Despite Google, US business is likely to remain
the lobby that argues hardest for continuing engagement with China.
The pressures for disengagement will come from
labour activists, security hawks and politicians particularly in Congress. To
date, the Obama administration has based its policy firmly on the assumptions
that have governed Americas approach to China for a generation. The
presidents recent set-piece speech on Asia was a classic statement of the case
for US engagement with China complete with the ritualistic assertion that
America welcomes Chinas rise. But, after being censored by Chinese television
in Shanghai and harangued by a junior Chinese official at the Copenhagen
climate talks, Barack Obama may be feeling less warm towards Beijing. An early
sign that the White House is hardening its policy could come in the next few
months, with an official decision to label China a currency manipulator.
Even if the administration itself does not
move, the voices calling for tougher policies against China are
likely to get louder in Congress. Googles decision to highlight the dangers of
cyberattack from China will play to growing American security fears about
China. The development of Chinese missile systems that threaten US naval dominance
in the Pacific are also causing concern in Washington. Impending US arms sales
to Taiwan are already provoking a dispute.
Meanwhile, protectionism seems to be becoming
intellectually respectable in the US in ways that should worry China.
A trade war between America and China is
hardly to be welcomed. It could tip the world back into recession and inject
dangerous new tensions into international politics. If it happens, both sides
will share the blame. The US has been almost wilfully naive about the connections
between free trade and democracy. The Chinese have been provocative over
currency and human rights. If they want to head off a damaging clash wit